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Law as Theory: Constitutive Thought in the Formation of (Legal) Practice
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                                           [ABSTRACT] 
Law in its practical guise is found to have a constituent correspondence with theory. 
 
„It‟s all very well in practice, but what about the theory?‟ 
Anon
2
 
 
Introduction 
Marcel Proust, once the student of law and always the social analyst, wrote to his 
friend George de Lauris in 1903 complaining that „your blasted laws,‟ the anti-
clerical laws of the later nineteenth century, produced a certain closing of the mind, 
an „intellectual protectionism;‟ and more specifically he complained that the 
intolerance that these laws had produced in school education „is a sign of the 
dangerous state of mind to which the [Dreyfus] Affair, etc. gave rise.‟3 Immediately 
and poignantly, he goes on to instance this: 
 
                                                 
1
 This is a revised version of a talk given on 19
th
 May 2006 to the Belgian section of the Internatonal 
Association for Legal Theory in the seminar series „Is Legal Thinking a Practice?‟ Thanks to Laurent 
de Sutter for the kind invitation. Thanks also to Richard Joyce for adroit editing and for 
companionship in research. Further thanks to the participants in the seminar for telling comments, and 
special thanks to Desirée Lundstrom and Mireille Hildebrandt for an enlightening correspondence 
arising out of the seminar and the paper given there. 
2
 Yet more thanks this time to Sundhya Pahuja for tracking down a number of sources for this reversal 
of the standard apothegm – a number so huge that the attribution can only be anon.. 
3
 Proust, Marcel, Selected Letters 1880-1903, trans. R Manheim, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1985), at 342-4. 
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…I must tell you that at Illiers, a village at whose school prize-giving 
ceremony my father presided the day before yesterday, the priest has 
not been invited to the prize-giving since Ferry‟s laws. The pupils are 
taught to look upon all who associate with that priest as persons to be 
avoided… . And I, who remember this little Beauce village, where all 
eyes are turned towards the niggardly earth, mother of avarice, where 
the sole striving towards the sky, sometimes mottled with clouds but 
often divinely blue and every evening at sunset transfigured, where the 
only striving towards the sky remains that of the church‟s pretty 
steeple – I, who remember the village priest, who taught me Latin and 
the names of the flowers in his garden – …I don‟t think it is right to 
have stropped inviting the old priest to the prize-giving, since in the 
village he stands for something more difficult to define than the social 
function symbolized by the pharmacist, the retired tobacco-monopoly 
engineer and the optician, but which is every bit as worthy of respect. 
4
 
 
That this was no transient piece of sentimentality is painfully revealed by the 
passionate intensity which fires Proust‟s letter and by his more general insistence 
„that anti-clericals…draw a few distinctions and look closely at the great social 
edifices that they want to demolish before setting to work on them.‟5 If Proust had 
been more uncharitably inclined, he could have added that the same Jules Ferry 
responsible for anti-clerical laws in education, minister for public instruction and 
later prime minister, that same Ferry saw secular public education „as a means of 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., at 343. 
5
 Ibid., at 345. 
 3 
creating national unity through a “religion of the fatherland”‟, a „Comtean religion of 
Progress and Humanity‟ imbued by, in Ferry‟s words, „the great Being which cannot 
perish.‟6 
Although my presiding concern will be that „something more difficult to define‟ 
intimated by Proust, for immediate purposes his constrained view of the professional 
practice typified „by the pharmacist, the retired tobacco-monopoly engineer and the 
optician‟ is hardly propitious.7 If, coming to the theme of this seminar series, „is legal 
thinking a practice?‟, we were to follow Proust‟s constrained view, then we would 
only reproduce standard and dismissive notions of how limited and limiting legal 
thinking is. That drab conclusion would in a way be confirmed by the marginalizing, 
the disregard of theory as opposed to practice: „legal theory,‟ writes Laurent de 
Sutter, „is no longer respected among the legal field,‟ and he would add that legal 
theorists, perhaps in self-defence, „are more and more claiming the necessity to stay 
close to the reality of law,‟ before concluding that „the malentendu between legal 
theory and legal practice has never been so strong.‟8 Now, „mal-entendu‟ has been 
appropriated as an English word. The helpful hyphen accentuates a literal meaning. 
This is a meaning that does not conform to the standard definition or translation as 
„misapprehension‟ or „misunderstanding‟. Rather, as between legal theory and legal 
practice there is some evident, if narrow, apprehension or understanding. But what I 
will show is that there is an illness, something wrong or blocked, in the apprehension 
or understanding between them. That pathology will be identified as something of a 
méconnaissance, as a disregard, or an inadequate regard for, that dimension of life 
                                                 
6
 Burleigh, Michael, Earthly Powers: Religion and Politics in Europe from the Enlightenment to the 
Great War (London, HarperCollins, 2005), at 342-3. 
7
 Proust, above n 3, at 343. 
8
 de Sutter, Laurent, personal communication, 28 May 2005, setting out the generative terms for the 
seminar series: see n1. 
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which Proust saw being denied, even eliminated in a profane practicality – not 
necessarily an institutionally religious dimension, I hasten to add. More positively, 
that dimension of life will here be related to practice, and legal practice, by way of its 
affinity to theory. This, I will argue, is theory as necessary for the constitution of 
practice, and theory to which constituent dimensions of law correspond. For now, I 
will orient that overall argument by adapting the concern of this seminar series with 
legal thinking to a consideration of the failed attempts to constitute a thought of 
modern law. 
 
Constitutive Thoughts of Law 
 
Although it is to claim too much too soon, there are modernist indications of an 
affinity between law and that dimension of being discerned by Proust in the 
religious. Confining ourselves to that revolutionary tradition – an alluring oxymoron 
– drawn on by Ferry, Mirabeau wrote in 1792 that „the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man has become a political Gospel and the French Constitution a religion for which 
people are prepared to die.‟9 In another representative view, the people are portrayed 
simultaneously as recognizing the revolutionary „Supreme Being‟ and as ready „to 
sacrifice itself wholly for law.‟10 And in more of an operative vein, Chénier heralded 
the revolutionary national „religion…of which our law-makers are the preachers, the 
magistrates the pontiffs.‟11 Law, law in operation, was taken to match such deific 
                                                 
9
 Burleigh, above n 6, at 81. 
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 Ibid., at 94-5. 
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attributes with its fusing of a near-invariant content with a near-comprehensive 
power of determination.
12
  
Standard modernist claims for law are no more modest.
13
 I will take the rule of 
law as exemplary here, although later I will be attributing its qualities more 
expansively to law itself. For the rule of law, for law to rule, there are some practical 
requirements that would appear to be decidedly impractical. For law to rule it must 
assume a sameness of content by which to rule, its legendary stability and 
predictability. Yet it must also be capable of vacating its existing content if it is not 
to become incapable of ruling a situation changing, changing infinitely, around it. 
That extensiveness of law requires of it both a self-asserting force of incipient 
determination and a self-denying openness of response. These contrary dimensions 
of law‟s rule – sameness and changefulness, stability and variability – have been 
matched by a swirling jurisprudential debate. With one side of the debate, we find 
that for law, and „not men,‟ to rule it must be autonomous, enclosed in itself, 
coherent in itself, and, in a sense above all, self-generating. In stark contrast, on the 
other side of the debate we find that law is dependent – dependent on „social change‟ 
and such, that it is thence necessarily open and intrinsically oriented in a protean 
attunement to what is ever outside of or beyond it.  
Allow me first to prepare the ground, as it were, by looking at the connection 
between what have been the different failures of this jurisprudential debate to 
                                                 
12
 See eg: Stone, Julius, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (London, Stevens, 1964), at 213 and, 
extending the revolutionary tradition to the Napoleonic codes, see Kelley, Donald R, History, Law and 
the Human Sciences: Medieval and Renaissance Perspectives (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1984), at 42-3. 
13
 Although the distinction in terms of „modern‟ law fits in with the narrative here, my overall 
argument will indicate that „modern‟ law should not be seen as entirely distinct from other epochal 
types of law. 
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constitute law in either of these two dimensions.
14
 One way of evoking the failure to 
capture the ipseity of law in the first dimension would be to focus on perhaps the 
most rigorously sustained effort to do so, that of Kelsen. It is so well-rehearsed that 
the detail would be tedious, but the point I want to stress here, unfairly, is Kelsen‟s 
most egregious problem, the problem of what is ultimately constitutive of law. His 
cleanly coherent scheme, his „pure theory of law,‟ falters when his structured 
constitution of the law comes to its ultimate point of coherence, comes to the famed 
grundnorm, a norm which stands outside of the law that it ultimately constitutes. The 
identity of this grundnorm, this basic norm, alternates vertiginously between legal 
norm, legal transcendent, vacuous pre-supposition, and hypothesis.
15
 
Although this opening to an uncertainty, even to an emptiness, in law‟s „original‟ 
relation is considered a failure in Kelsen‟s theory, I will later adopt it obliquely as a 
success, but in the meantime, and to indicate that an imperative quality of law may 
be involved here, I will show how perhaps the most notable attempt to rectify 
Kelsen‟s grundnorm, at least in an English tradition, ends up repeating its supposed 
failure. Again, brevity is appropriate. In The Concept of Law Hart follows a trail that 
is both Kelsen‟s and „very familiar:‟ „if the question is raised whether some 
suggested rule is legally valid, we must in order to answer the question use a 
criterion of validity provided by some other rule.‟16 Rule is thus hierarchically 
connected to rule, culminating at a point where no further connection is possible. 
Here we find an ultimate rule of recognition which imparts an integral existence to 
law. Without going into the detail of how this rule of recognition may differ from 
                                                 
14
 The account that follows could be read as so many instances of theory as practice, of theory reduced 
to ossified practice, with the putative theory setting the mantric terms for what becomes various 
jurisprudential orthodoxies. My analysis focuses on a dynamic opposed to this but such stultifying of 
theory also needs attention. 
15
 See the range of more or less plausible attributions surveyed in Stone, above n 12, at 124-5. 
16
 Hart,  HLA, The Concept of Law, (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), at 103. 
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Kelsen‟s grundnorm, let us proceed to the similarity of ostensible failure. The 
obvious problem which now supervenes, as Hart sees it, is that „the rule which, in the 
last resort, is used to identify the law escapes the conventional categories for 
describing the legal system.‟17 At which point Hart finds he has to resort to 
something beyond law to establish the existence of the rule of recognition, something 
which is „an empirical, though complex, question of fact.‟18 Hart wants also to say, if 
not very loudly, that the rule of recognition somehow combines law and fact, 
somehow combines what is within and what is beyond law; yet Hart had already 
founded his search for „the concept of law‟ on the inability of factual observation 
from beyond the constituted law to account for it.
19
  
We could perhaps begin to move beyond the jurisprudential failure to provide an 
integral thought of law‟s self-constitution by connecting this failure to the more 
general modernist failure to constitute the thing-in-itself. At this stage I will confine 
the connection to another tantalizing failure as observed by Nietzsche: „“Things that 
have a constitution in themselves” – a dogmatic idea with which one must break 
absolutely;‟ to which he would add, no more amenably, „there is no thing without 
other things, i.e., there is no “thing-in-itself.”‟20 Later I will more agreeably attribute 
a certain necessary, if precarious, success to the effort to constitute law as the thing-
in-itself, but for now I will only draw on a parallel in the failures to constitute law 
and to constitute the thing-in-itself, a parallel which reveals each as constituted by 
the relation to „other things,‟ to what is beyond it. 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., at 107. 
18
 Ibid., at 107, 245. 
19
 Ibid., at 108 and, for this inability of factual observation, see chs 2-4. Strictly, what factual 
observation is unable to account for is the legal rule but for Hart law is a system of rules. 
20
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale, (New York, 
Vintage Books, 1968), at 302 (ss 557 and 559).  
 8 
Which takes us to the other side of the jurisprudential debate, to the mode of 
constituting law in a dependent relation to what is apart from or other to it. The 
scholarship on law and society is perhaps the most conspicuous instance. The type of 
constitutive force claimed here could be called „strong‟. This strong force is, in terms 
of Kant‟s idea of the constitutive, „practically determining.‟21 It would be at least 
courteous to engage initially with this constituting of law by way of a specifically 
„constitutive theory‟ in Jurisprudence and in the social theory of law. In one of its 
dynamics, this constitutive theory is a reaction against the „domain assumption‟ of 
most scholarship on law and society, the assumption that law is constituted in a 
comprehensively dependent relation on society, usually a relation in which law is 
rendered as an instrument of society.
22
 Proponents of this constitutive theory are 
prompted at least in part by the observation of situations where law appears to be 
constituting or, in the accepted terminology, shaping social relations or social 
identities. So, such theorists would have it that not only is law constituently 
dependent on society, but society is also constituently dependent on law – a matter, 
in all, of „complex, mutually constitutive relationships.‟23 This perceived mutuality is 
not confined to that between law and society. Other theorists would object to the 
instrumental constitution of law in terms of its dependent relation to, for example, 
economy or some overall „structure in dominance,‟ and they would grant law its own 
                                                 
21
 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007), at 286 (5:457).  
22
 The term „domain assumption‟ is taken from Gouldner, Alvin W, The Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology (London, Heinemann, 1971), at 31. 
23
 Mertz, Elizabeth, „Legal Loci and Places in the Heart: Community and Identity in Sociolegal 
Studies,‟ (1994) 28 Law & Society Review 971, at 972. 
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constitutive force in any such relation.
24
 I will, however, continue with the instance 
of society here. 
Without wishing to dissent at all from this constitutive theory, not least because I 
will end up adopting something like it, there are some rather immediate problems 
with it. Bluntly, we would plunge into circularity and a certain inconsequence if we 
purport to constitute something in a relation to that which it constitutes. With the 
strong or practically determining mode of constitution, the situation involved here 
cannot be one where law and society relate simply as a matter of marginal or vague 
influence. If this were all they did, then the distinct integrity of each would be simply 
affirmed and they would not be constituted relationally. They must, then, be related 
in a necessary way to the effect that one would be „constitutively‟ different or non-
existent without its relation to the other. Yet if law and society are produced in „their‟ 
relation, what is there to keep them distinct, to keep them as distinct „things‟? Why 
should they not simply dissipate in the relational soup? To counter this dissipation, 
we would seem to need a tertium quid or need each thing to be constituted in itself as 
well as being constituted relationally. More on that delicate combination and the 
commonality later. All I wish to extract at this stage by way of the specific 
constitutive theory of law is that law and society seem to be constituted in a relation 
to each other, a relation that is necessary but indefinite. 
That outcome would seem to be replicated with a venerable variety of 
jurisprudential positivism. This is not just positivism now in the sense of a self-
positing by law but, rather, a positing of law as the resultant of something else, the 
                                                 
24
 A once-famous statement of the case was E. P. Thompson‟s objection that the confinement of law 
in terms such as „structure in dominance‟ confines it to a thoroughly subordinate „level‟ whereas the 
glorious sweep of his intemperate observation found a constituent law that „did not keep politely to a 
“level” but was at every bloody level:‟ Thompson, EP, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays 
(London, Merlin Press, 1978), at 130. 
 10 
sovereign or sovereignty being the main contenders. This monocausal scenario can 
be readily disrupted, however, if we move beyond the reduced renditions of the 
ancestor-figures forced to support it. So, Bodin is invoked frequently for the nostrum 
that „[t]he first attribute of the sovereign prince…is the power to make law binding 
on all his subjects;‟ to which nostrum he would resoundingly add that „the principal 
mark of sovereign majesty and absolute power is the right to impose laws generally 
on all subjects regardless of their consent;‟ and for good measure, „it is expedient that 
if he is to govern his state well, a sovereign prince must be above the law.‟25 Yet, and 
this is much less frequently remarked, Bodin would in many ways scale down such 
sovereign conceit. I will take only two of them here. With one, Bodin would bind the 
sovereign in the „covenants‟ made with the subject, covenants not to be „confused‟ 
with law since law is the creation of the sovereign and does not bind him, whereas 
covenants with the subject do so bind him.
26
 But the abjection of law itself is sharply 
qualified in the second way of constraining sovereignty where, towards the end of 
The Six Books of the Commonwealth, law is accorded a practical primacy, for if the 
commonwealth, no matter by what kind of „sovereign power‟ it is ruled, „is governed 
without law and all is left to the discretion of the magistrates to distribute pains and 
penalties according to the importance and status of each individual, such estate could 
be neither stable nor durable… . There would be no bond of union between the great 
and the humble, and therefore no harmony between them.‟27  
The other primal upholder of the sovereign as law‟s epigenesis, and perhaps the 
most influential, is of course Hobbes. And, as is excessively well know, for Hobbes a 
law is an emanation of the sovereign, and the sovereign Leviathan is nothing less 
                                                 
25
 Bodin, Jean, Six Books of the Commonwealth, trans. MJ Tooley, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, nd), at 
32, 43 (book I, chs 8 and 10). 
26
 Ibid., at 29-30, 34 (book I, ch 8). 
27
 Ibid., at 206 (book VI, ch 6). 
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than a „Mortal God,‟ one with a complete and terrifying power.28 Yet closer 
acquaintance with Leviathan reveals an unexpectedly tender side. Leviathan remains 
bound by the covenants that brought it, and political society, into existence. These 
were covenants between a people whose life was not so unrelievedly dire as Hobbes 
at times takes it to be, and from that life the people retain a primal efficacy which 
Leviathan must accommodate if it is not to lose the right of sovereign rule.
29
 From 
that restriction on Leviathan, then, Hobbes derives an extensive list of „liberties,‟ and 
from Leviathan‟s constituent duty to secure „the safety of the people‟ Hobbes derives 
even more since: „by safety here is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other 
Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt 
to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.‟30 In a like vein of empathic 
engagement with its subjects, the very commands of Leviathan, the laws, must be 
„good,‟ equal in their application, impartially administered, knowable, and few.31 
Even more startling, just as „men‟ have been able to create a sovereign Leviathan, „so 
also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civile Lawes, which they themselves, 
by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, 
to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power, and at the other end to their own 
Ears.‟32  
                                                 
28
 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), at 120 (87). 
29
 For these revisionist points and the line of argument that follows now, see Fitzpatrick, Peter, 
Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 93-5, 105-7; 
and looking further afield into the works of Hobbes see especially ibid., at chs 14-15, and Hobbes, 
Thomas, The Elements Of Law Natural And Politic (Whitefish, Kessinger Publishing, nd), at 58, 61 
(ch 16, para 4 and ch 17, para 2), and generally ch 18; also Hobbes, Thomas, De Cive (Whitefish, 
Kessinger Publishing, nd), at 18, 41 (ch 1, para XV and ch 4, para I), and Hobbes, Thomas, A 
Dialogue between a Philosopher & a Student of the Common Laws of England (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1971), at 68, 166 (paras 27-8 and para 204). 
30
 Hobbes, Leviathan, above n 28, at 231 (175) – his emphasis. 
31
 Ibid., at 203 (152), 237-40 (180-2). 
32
 Ibid., at 147 (108-9) – his emphasis. The imagery is especially telling in that the all-powerful 
Leviathan evokes Job where we find that this creature of the sea cannot be „draw[n] out…with a 
hook…or his tongue with a cord which thou lettest down‟ (41:1). 
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Very much in the shadow of Hobbes, but of historically unsurpassed significance 
in English jurisprudence, there is John Austin. He will provide our final example of 
the dubious sovereign source of law. With little strain on originality, Austin initially 
announces that law is a command of a political superior to a political inferior, and 
that this „superiority…is styled sovereignty;‟ and, indeed, an exclusive and 
independent sovereignty accorded general and habitual obedience is necessary for 
„political society‟ and law to exist.33 There is, however, at least an ambivalence to the 
criterion of habitual obedience on the part of the populace. It is such habitual 
obedience to law which Austin relies on to distinguish an operative sovereignty when 
it is subordinated to a superior power; so, it was such habitual obedience which 
ensured that „the French government was sovereign or independent‟ even whilst that 
same government „obeyed‟ the allied armies occupying France in 1815.34 All that 
marks, all that constitutes this beleaguered sovereign is law in the obedience to it. 
And, furthermore, the populace do not exhibit a numbed or simply sovereign-led 
obedience; rather, for Austin the legal rule entails a felt obligation to follow it.
35
  
Of course, within a milieu of legal theory some account must be taken of the 
famed corrective Hart administered to Austin on precisely this matter of obligation, a 
corrective facilitated by Hart‟s ignoring what Austin wrote on this score.36 Briefly, 
for Hart it was inadequate to see law as the command of the sovereign habitually 
obeyed because seeing law in this way ignored the element of obligation in law. For 
Hart law is given affect by legal rules being carriers of obligation, and hence being 
things formed and used by people in active and reflective ways, and not by people as 
                                                 
33
 Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Second Edition) and Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (London, John Murray, 1861-3), at vol 1: 1, 5, 170-3, 179. 
34
 Ibid., at vol 1: 172-3. 
35
 Ibid., at vol 2: 3, 15, 158-9. 
36
 Ibid. 
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mere creatures of habit. He would also depart from venerable attempts in 
Jurisprudence to identify law in terms of some „external‟ factuality, and he would do 
so by bringing to bear an integral „internal‟ aspect of rules in which people use rules 
„in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the basis for 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism or punishment, viz., in all the familiar 
transactions of life according to rules.‟37 In this way Hart opens up law demotically 
in a relation between it and the social, but having done so he resorts to various 
expedients to close it down again, for example by asserting a stable and containing 
„core‟ to all rules, the impossible core-in-itself, or by finding that for a legal system 
to exist it is only officials who need exercise the internal aspect of rules, leaving law 
with no constituent relation to an impossibly inert society, a society of automatons 
subject to the absolute rule of these officials.
38
  
The jurisprudential impasse in the many manifestations of it just considered is 
that the constitutive thought of law impels us to see law as dependent on its relation 
to other things such as sovereign or society, yet when we regard those other things in 
relation to law, they appear to be dependent on it or to assume an impossible 
existence if separated from it. I will now explore that seeming impasse by way of 
some characteristic concerns with practice and with theory and in this way move 
towards a more integrated constitutive thought of law. The outcome, in terms of the 
story so far, is that one cannot theorise law as if theory in some way preceded law 
because their constituent dimensions are the same and unsurpassable. 
 
Theorising practice and practicing theory 
                                                 
37
 Hart, above n 16, at 88. 
38
 See Fitzpatrick, Peter, The Mythology of Modern Law (London, Routledge, 1992), at 197-201, 207. 
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Legal „practice‟ of the kind posed by Laurent de Sutter39 – the practice of the legal 
profession, of legal practitioners, the practice of the courts – this practice is meant to 
have a situated solidity to it. It is what is commonly, actively, palpably done. To put 
something into practice is to commit it to an operatively immediate and secure 
domain. „Practice‟ contrasts in all of this with an ethereal, attenuated, conjectural, 
impractical „theory.‟ The heretical thought that „practice‟ may not be so practically 
amenable is indicated by the Oxford English Dictionary where „practice‟ is accorded 
no less than fifteen senses.
40
 And our uncertainty about practice may be compounded 
if we recall that its philosophical siblings have failed to account for its formation. 
Some time ago, but not without more „ancient‟ precedents, Hume revealed that 
empiricism, as a reliance on practical experience, does not give us any confident 
grasp on a reality external to us.
41
 Just as discouraging, if more productive, is the 
outcome reached by pragmatism, that most „practical‟ of philosophies. The argument 
here, made by way of a brief focus on the two „classical‟ pragmatists, will be that 
pragmatism‟s abiding utility – what it might do for, say, law or politics – reproduces 
the very dimensions of more „theoretical‟ philosophy that it would seek to 
subordinate or surpass. For Charles Sanders Peirce, pragmatism was to give us 
„practical bearings,‟ yet this could still lead us to an ultimate truth commanding 
universal assent – an achievement more akin to absolutist metaphysics.42 More 
typical of pragmatism, truthful perception for William James produces, or there is 
                                                 
39
 See note 1 as well as note 8 above and the accompanying text. 
40
 Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, CD-ROM v 3.1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004), „practice‟. 
41
 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, Penguin, 1969), at 44-6. This is one, if famed, 
strand of Humean thought and does not take account of his claim that it is our human nature that 
connects us, with some efficacy, to reality. Since Hume would also deny rational thought the ability to 
make that connection, it remains ultimately impossible to establish it in such rational terms. 
42
 Peirce, Charles Sanders, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume V: Pragmatism and 
Pragmaticism (Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), at 2 and 37. 
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nothing to stop it producing, as many practical truths as there are perceivers.
43
 We 
could, however, pragmatically use these failures to give us a ground for the 
formation of practice, use them to begin to indicate what is involved in such a 
formation. 
Hume‟s difficulty is, of course, usually taken to be characteristic of modernity, a 
modernity in which there is no transcendent and resolving reference endowing our 
experience or our practice with assured content. Nor, coming from within that 
experience or practice, can we extend to or encompass its constituent relations. The 
determination of its relational „context can never be entirely certain or saturated.‟44 In 
a sense aptly then, James would bequeath a collection of stark singularities from 
which, in their incommensurable diversity, no commonality of experience or of 
practice could be distilled. Or, in the alternative, if the only allowable possibility 
remains that experiences or practices are incommensurable yet somehow in common, 
then the only available commonality would require them to be the same as each other 
and hence entirely commensurable. The equivalent in Peirce‟s terms would have to 
be at least the prospect of surpassing truth in which the singularities would be quite 
subsumed.  
More positively, we could extract from this refined failure of practical formation 
the opening to another approach. Practice entails the distinctiveness, the singularity 
of lived experience as opposed to some „theoretical,‟ some general or rationalized 
accounting for experience. Putting aside the rendering of practice as the solitary 
activity or habit of an individual person, if persons are in a practice, or carrying on a 
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practice, the singularity of the lived experience of each in that practice cannot, as we 
just saw, subsist simply as singular, as incommensurable. This is not simply because 
any practice involves an element of commonality to which singularity must give 
way, at least to some extent. Rather, and paradoxical as it may seem, the existence 
and maintaining of singularity depends, as we saw, on the element of commonality. 
The alternatives, as we also saw, would entail the loss of singularity either, with 
James, in sameness or, with Peirce, in a subsumption to some terminal truth.  
If, however, the singular carrying on of a practice has to be attuned to the 
commonality of that practice, the commonality itself has to be receptive to the 
singularity. Singularity would be lost if the commonality on which it depends were 
enduringly set.
45
 Furthermore, the determinative affirmation of a set content would 
be inimical to the infinite variety of possible relation between singularities. It would 
also be inimical to the infinite variety of possible relation between the practice and 
the world. These relational imperatives have, as it were, to be built into the living 
commonality. Yet this commonality cannot be an utterly receptive vacuity since that 
would leave the only available commonality as an entirely commensurable sameness, 
and that would be to deny singularity. So, there has to be some set content to the 
commonality.  
Such seemingly opposed dimensions of the commonality, its set and its receptive 
dimensions, can be illustrated in the correspondence often drawn between practice 
and custom or customary action.
46
 Custom is usually taken as typifying the set 
dimension. It is fixed and unchanging. To comply with one English criterion, it must 
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be immemorial.
47
 Yet custom would no longer be custom if it were not receptively 
transformative. Should it cease to be receptive, cease to change with changing 
conditions, cease adequately to correspond to what is actually done, it can no longer 
be the custom of the grouping in which it once pertained. I will now develop the 
seeming opposition between these dimensions of practice by way of a 
companionable account of theory and then of law. 
Bluntly, theory is that which unifies these dimensions of practice. If this may be 
modestly assumed for the moment, then we would expect theory to be intimately tied 
to practice since it must take into itself the constituent dimensions of practice. Yet if 
it is to unify these dimensions, it cannot simply be identified with practice and with 
these disparate dimensions of practice. It must stand markedly apart from practice.  
Conveniently for this assumption about theory, for this theory of theory, the many 
meanings ascribed to „theory‟ can be divided between those which would see theory 
and practice as congruent, even as the same, and those which would see theory as 
radically different from and opposed to practice.
48
 This latter oppositional variety of 
meaning usually comes from settings empathic to practice, settings in which theory is 
diminished or merely suppositional, and out of touch with the experience of 
situations „on the ground.‟ There can, however, be some convergence between such 
oppositional meaning and meanings that would import an identity between theory 
and practice. We see this in varieties of praxis where the opposition must be 
overcome by thoroughly aligning theory with material practice. Other ideas of praxis 
would not so much subordinate theory to practice as merge the two in some sublation 
or apotheosis.  Theory thence becomes contained and deposed by „theoretism.‟ 
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Guided by Bakhtin, „theoretism‟ can be described as „the rationalistic desire to 
subsume the open-ended and “messy” qualities of real-life communicative and social 
acts under the aegis of an “all-encompassing explanatory system–”‟ a suppression of 
„the “eventness” of the everyday social world.‟49 Inversely, the connection to practice 
remains essential for theory. 
If we may now gloss slightly Greek etymologies for „theory‟ we would find it is 
most commonly described in terms of a viewing or a seeing.
50
 Simply viewing or 
seeing would fit the absorptive passivity which theory must have to accommodate 
the receptive dimension of the commonality of practice. But to combine the receptive 
and the set dimensions of the commonality of practice, theory has to be more than 
passive, and an obliging etymology would also offer a more active sense of 
„looking:‟51 the opening receptiveness of theory integrates with a prehensive 
orientation that takes impetus from the commonality of practice but which is always 
extending illimitably beyond it. The receptive passivity and the active orientation 
join together in a responsiveness of theory, in what could be called the responsibility 
of theory, in its being responsable, to resurrect an antique spelling.
52
 The combining 
of the set and receptive dimensions of practice, this responsibility of theory, into 
some accounting for or explaining of practice can never itself be set. The seeming 
resolution of the dimensions „in theory‟ is only ever for the time being. Borrowing 
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from Derrida in a somewhat different context, theoretical designation „gathers 
together the corpus and, at the same time, in the same blinking of an eye, keeps it 
from closing, from identifying itself with itself.‟53 
Whilst this non-closure or non-fulfilment intrinsic to theory would deny 
invariance to practice and would eternally counter the pretence of its being a thing-
in-itself, theory‟s responsibility in its uniting of the set and receptive dimensions of 
practice is to endow practice with some stability.
54
 But this is a stability that cannot 
be reduced to the set dimension of practice. Stability, says Derrida, „is not natural, it 
is because there is instability that stabilization becomes necessary.‟55 „All stability in 
a place,‟ adds Derrida, is „but a stabilization or sedentarization;‟ „displacement,‟ or 
„the process of dislocation is no less arch-originary, that is, just as „archaic‟ as the 
archaism that is always dislodged.‟56 The outcome generated by theory is that this 
„stability‟ of practice has to be held to. What endurance it has cannot only be in-itself 
but has to be in its labile engagement with and accommodation of its constant 
„displacement‟ or „dislocation,‟ of its being ejected or drawn out from its set or 
determinate place into the insistent possibility of its being otherwise. 
And so, to law. Resuming now the earlier constitutive thoughts about law, the 
difficulty in claiming law for an encapsulated practice, for legal practice, is 
heightened by that persistent effort and that persistent failure, which we have already 
observed, to constitute law as an encapsulated thing-in-itself. In practical terms we 
know that, „in law,‟ „no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely‟ in 
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advance the outcome of any decision.
57
 Indeed, if there were no challenge to, no 
disruption of, an encapsulated practice, there would be no call for law, for the legal 
decision. In responding to that call, law goes ever beyond its determinate existence, 
and in so doing it takes on the receptive dimension of the commonality of practice. 
Yet in extending itself this way, law is not purely, passively receptive. Law extends 
in an active responsiveness, an engaged responsibility. That responsiveness and 
responsibility are oriented in part by the configured contents of law, contents formed 
„in practice‟ and which have to be already „there‟ so as to be able to base a claim or 
argument and to feed judgement. 
There is, I hope, by now no need to underline the similarity between the 
constitution of theory and of law just outlined, but there remains still a need to 
extend the similarity to the earlier and resonant account of law and the jurisprudential 
impasses that got us to this stage. Like theory, law‟s responsiveness and 
responsibility are oriented illimitably. That imperative was at least intimated by the 
jurisprudential attempts to trace an instituted, a posited law to its constituent sources 
– attempts such as those by Kelsen and Hart which end in a failure of delimitation, a 
productive failure that came from the pursuit of law‟s self-constitution, and a failure 
that intimated something ever beyond any constitution posited in-itself. The 
alternative jurisprudential tradition would erect a constitutive source apart from law 
and thoroughly account for law in its terms, society and the sovereign being the two 
instances we considered earlier. Such efforts were, however, met with counter-
indications that society and the sovereign constituently depended on law. 
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It was Hobbes, as we saw, who tied the mighty sovereign both to law and to 
primal covenants that were socially constitutive.
58
 We could now return to Derrida so 
as to bring law and the social closer together: 
 
[W]e are caught up, one and another, in a sort of heteronomic and 
dissymmetrical curving of social space – more precisely, a curving of 
the relation to the other: prior to all organized socius, all políteia, all 
determined „government‟, before all „law‟. Prior to and before all law, 
in Kafka‟s sense of being „before the law‟. 
Let‟s get this right: prior to all determined law, qua natural law or 
positive law, but not prior to law in general. For the heteronomic and 
dissymmetrical curving of a law of originary sociability is also a law, 
perhaps the very essence of law.
59
 
 
So, this law before the law, this law of the law, is in „essence‟ indistinguishable from 
law itself. It could thence be said, rather more compactly, with Rousseau: „Laws are 
really nothing other than the conditions on which civil society exists.‟60 
In so essentially generating the social, in so orienting us in our being together, 
law takes into itself those same combined dimensions which emerged from the 
relation of theory and of law to practice, the combining of the set and the receptive 
dimensions into a constituent responsiveness and responsibility. Much as that may 
have a ring of the conclusory to it, we are still left with the formidable challenge 
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posed by one of the preliminary constitutive thoughts raised earlier about law. That 
thought collected qualities marking the rule of law as something of a paradigm of the 
thing-in-itself. For the rule of law, or we could now say for law in its essence to rule 
as law and not as the instrument of something else, law would have to be 
autonomous, enclosed in itself, coherent in itself, and self-generating. If, or to the 
extent that, it failed to match any of these qualities, something else could rule instead 
of or in conjunction with law. Yet if law were not open, diverse, and constituently 
related to what was ever beyond it, it could not extend to and incipiently rule any 
effect or affect of our infinitely changeful being together. So, if law is to so extend 
and assume the capability of being ever otherwise to what it may be „at any one 
time,‟ it has to take on an ultimate vacuity, and that vacuity allows of its occupation 
by such as sovereign and society. 
The resolution, such as it is, is that law brings to bear on the alterity to which it 
constantly relates its qualities of autonomy, self-enclosing, self-cohering, and self-
generation. In so doing, it draws, „curves‟, borrowing Derrida‟s term, the alterity into 
a domain where these qualities are existent yet always potential and never fully 
realised or realisable. It is not possible to identify some density of realisation and 
take that as an indicator that law or the rule of law definitively exists. There is only 
ever as much law as there is. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this domain of potentiality law takes on an effective transcendence. It is only in 
transcendence that law‟s determinate content, its content for the time being, can be 
reconciled with law‟s infinite extensiveness and ultimate vacuity. Law partakes of 
 23 
that quasi-transcendentality‟ described by Derrida, as „at once ironic and serious.‟61 It 
„seriously‟ is a transcendence – „quasi-‟ perhaps because it claims no continuate 
determination, yet it is ironic in its assertion of a presence that is never enduringly 
present. It is a transcendence akin to that which Proust comes to give us in the steeple 
at Illiers solely „striving towards the sky‟ and ever surpassing a profane practice.62 
And so a generous Greek etymology would provide English with a further meaning 
of „theory,‟ theory as a theors, a legation that comes „to perform some religious rite 
or duty.‟63 
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